REBECCA BEACH SMITH, Chief Judge.
This matter comes before the court on the motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255 ("Motion") of the Petitioner, Christopher Damon Spencer ("Spencer").
On March 2, 2011, a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Virginia indicted Spencer on thirteen (13) counts. Count One charged Spencer with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Counts Two through Thirteen charged Spencer with distribution of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. On May 3, 2011, Spencer pled guilty to Count One before Magistrate Judge F. Bradford Stillman. On August 10, 2011, this court sentenced Spencer to two hundred thirty-five (235) months of imprisonment and five (5) years of supervised release.
On August 13, 2012, Spencer filed the instant Motion.
On August 14, 2012, the court entered an order directing the United States to respond, which it did on August 27, 2012. Spencer did not reply to the government's response, and the matter is ripe for review.
A prisoner may challenge a sentence imposed by a federal court if: 1) the sentence violates the Constitution or laws
In challenging his sentence, the prisoner bears the burden of proving one of the aforementioned grounds by a preponderance of the evidence. See Miller v. United States, 261 F.2d 546, 547 (4th Cir.1958). If he satisfies that burden, the court may vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). However, if the petitioner's motion, when viewed against the record, shows that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief, the court may summarily deny the motion. United States v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6, 7 (4th Cir.1988), abrogated on other grounds by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010).
The United States argues that Spencer has procedurally defaulted on his § 2255 claim because he did not raise the Simmons issues on direct appeal. As a general rule, "claims not raised on direct appeal may not be raised on collateral review unless the petitioner shows cause and prejudice." Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 123 S.Ct. 1690, 155 L.Ed.2d 714 (2003). In order to obtain collateral relief based on issues that could have been raised on direct appeal but were not, the movant must ordinarily show "`cause' excusing his ... procedural default," and "`actual prejudice' resulting from the errors of which he complains." United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-168, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982).
Even in the absence of a showing of cause for the procedural default and resulting prejudice, a defendant may proceed with a collateral attack if. he is able to show that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result were his claim denied. United States v. Maybeck, 23 F.3d 888, 892 (4th Cir.1994). To demonstrate a "miscarriage of justice," the petitioner "must show actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence." United States v. Williams, 396 Fed.Appx. 951, 953 (4th Cir.2010) (unpublished) (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986); United States v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490, 493 (4th Cir.1999)).
Spencer did not raise his objection at sentencing or on direct review.
The exceptions to procedural default do not save Spencer's claim, as he has not demonstrated cause excusing his default and prejudice from the alleged error, or actual innocence.
There is no cause that excuses Spencer's failure to bring his claim on
The change in law that Simmons effected does not render Spencer actually innocent of being a career offender. The Guidelines provide, in relevant part, that a defendant may be classified as a career offender, if he has at least two prior felony convictions of a controlled substance offense. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1. To qualify as a felony conviction of a controlled substance offense, the drug
The Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR") indicated that Spencer qualified as a career offender due to his conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in Norfolk Circuit Court on March 20, 1996, and his conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base in the United States District Court on November 20, 2003. PSR at SI 76. Both offenses unquestionably meet the definition of predicate "felony," even under Simmons. The Norfolk Circuit Court sentenced Spencer to twenty (20) years imprisonment under Va.Code § 18.2-248.
Spencer procedurally defaulted on his claim that he did not have the requisite predicate felonies to be classified as a career offender. Neither the "cause and prejudice" exception nor the "actual innocence" exception allows him to overcome his procedural default.
The Petitioner is
The Clerk is